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Foreword
In writing this paper I have examined the initial reaction
of Virginia's leaders to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
the Brown v. Board of Education suit.

My study begins with

announcement of the decision on May 17, 1954.

As the weeks

passed on the Commonwealth of Virginia gradually changed her
course, experimented with expedients, and set her mind on the
course of resistance.

The General Assembly proved this fact

by adopting the Resolution of Interposition on February 1,1956.
A natural termination date for the

~aper

is reached at this

point.
Throughout the paper there has been no effort to examine
the major events of the integration struggle in Virginia.

The

only reference to these events is made to illustrate the courses
of action taken by the leaders of Virginia.
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Chapter 1
Virginia's Initial Reaction
With the announcement of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Brown

v.

Board of Education, a trauma descended upon the

South--a trauma that was to rekindle old sentiments of animosity
and distrust.

The decision delivered on May 17, 1954, was one

of the first of many "civil rights" decisions which would
change a way of life in the South.

Of these decisions the

Brown pronouncement caused the most widespread reactions, for
it struck at the very heart of "Jim Crow-ism"--segregation in
education--when it stated that " ••• in the field of public
education the doctrine of !separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal •••• 11 1
Virginia, like many other southern and western states as
well,2 had operated the public s'Qb.ool system under the doctrine
of "separate but equal."

This concept was legally blessed

in 1896 when the U.S. Supreme Court used the term in the Plessy Y.!..
Ferguson case.

In that case the Court held that segregation

laws were legitimate as an exercise of the police power of a
state.3

Indeed, the Virginia State Constitution of 1901 directly

stated that "white and colored children shall not be taught
in the same sbhool. 11 4
Previous cases decided by the Court had forbidden segregation in interstate transportation and had attacked some public
educational institutions as being separate but unequal.

Because

of these decisions, the nation had expected the Bro\'fil decision
in time; but its actual pronouncement was no less a shock to
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the South.

Reaction to it varied to some degree among southern

leaders, but in general the tone of their first statements was
mild.

Even within Virginia the character of statements made

by public officials varied.
Dr. Dowell J. Howard, the Superi!l;]endent of Public
Instruction, reflected the general tenor of Virginia's leadership in May of 1954:

"\Ve are trying to teach school children

the law of the land and we will abide by it.

Virginia has

always taken care of her problems, and I think she still has
that ability. n5

Virginia Attorney-General J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,

foresaw a rational approach to the problem, and Governor Thomas
B. Stanley plarmed to call public officials

toge~her

to find

a solution acceptable to the citizens and to the Court as well.6
Public reaction at first reflected to a great extent the
reaction of the state officials.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch,

Virginia's major newspaper, called for a "calm and unhysterical
appraisal of the situation. 11 7

Even Richmond's News:.,.Leader,

which later took a most extreme position, counselled moderation
as well as resistance in May.8

Indeed, the initial reaction

of the South as a whole was much less severe than might have
been expected.

Within a few weeks, however, the Times-Dispatch

was to move away from this position as were the leaders of the
Commonwealth.
In retrospect there seems to have been an inaccurate
reflection of Virginia's real attitude in the statements of
public officials in May.

Perhaps the bitterness that was: simmering

below the surface was more accurately reflected by the student

-3newspaper of the University of Virginia:

" ••• we feel that

the people of the South are justified in their bitterness concerning the decision.

To many people this decision is contrary

to a way of life and violates the way in which they have
thought since 1619."9

Few newspapers openly expressed such

feelings during the days immediately following the decision,
unless such expressions were hidden in counsel for patience.
U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd's thought, for many years a
fairly accurate reflection of Virginia's official opinion, was
blunt.

The Court's ruling was to him the most serious blow

that had been struck againsttthe rights of the statea.10

Byrd

was one of the South's moat highly-respected leaders, and his
opinions in most matters commanded great influence.

His

popularity among southerners was reflected by his many nominations
as a regional favorite-son candidate for the Presidency.

In

the integration controversy Byrd's sentiments were to rule the
day in Virginia's answer to the Brown decii.sion.
Virgina's "explosion" was a type of delayed reaction,
and there was ample reason for this

de~ay.

The Court had

specifically postponed the implementation of the decision _until
arguments concerning the method of application could be heard
from the states affected.

This provision gave the southern

states some hope that their segregated system might be maintained more or less intact.

Leading constitutional lawyers

had stated again and again that the Court was obligated to allow
each state to devise the means for implementation of the decision
within its borders.11

-4BtownLll
When United States Attorney-General Fl• iawne 81111>: invited

the southern governors to discuss with him the legal courses
open to their states, many Virginians gained more hope that a
satisfactory solution could be found.

Only three states, how-

ever, accepted this invitation--Mississippi, Virginia, and
Florida--and even then (May 22, 1954) Virginia was still leading
the way toward compliance.

h'ven the NAACP felt that Virginia

could be expected to readjust in an "amicable fashion. 11 12
The effort to find a solution to the problem was no
doubt sincere.

For many dacades the white, Protestant, Anglo-

Saxon had felt secure in the United States, especially in the
South;13

and the Brown decision came to be seen as a threat

to that security.

A former governor of Virginia had even

warned his state to be on guard against "the mongrelization
of our Anglo-Saxon stock. 11 14

The Anglo-Saxon population of

Virginia is perhaps as concentrated as in any southern state,
and such a concentration is especially noticeable in the
Southside and Tidewater counties--the areas of Virginia with
the highest Negro population as well.

In 1949 V.O. Key, Jr.,

an authority on the political issues of the day, characterized
~irginia's

politics as being oriented around the race issue,

as was the political situation of every other southern state.
His words became especially applicable in the 1950's:

"The

race issue broadly defined thus must be considered as the
number one problem on the southern agenda.
for it, all else fails. 11 15

Lacking a solution

Virginia's emphasis now turned

completely to the race issue;

and no matter how trivial, every

issue seemed to be considered in light of that question.

-5Resentment to the Brown decision grew, and its growth can
be attributed to many causes.

Legal minds rejected the intro-

duction of sociological and psychological evidence as a be.Sis
for the decision. 16

The feeling that the decision was to some

extent based on political considerations encouraged bitterness. 17
The obsession that the North was imposing its will oni¥1 unwilling
COt\Str~a~•~~

but helpless South gave a sense of despair to the~people.1 8
These opinions, whether real or imagined, at first created
a sense of hopelessness.

Then blatant defiance arose.

Virginia

saw herself as the leader of the South, and the South gained
a greater sectional awareness than at any time since Reconstruction. 19

In August the Governor appointed a group to

study the situation.

From then on, Virginia moved rapidly from

compliance to defiance, an attitude which would have nationwide effects.

This reaction, at times termed "the gravest

Constitutional crisis since the Civil War, 11 20 was south-wide;
but Virginia's prestige among southern states gave her
great influence among her neighbors to the South.21

ac~ions
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Chapter 2
Changing Opinions
By the fall of 1954 Virginia was apparently steering a
course far from that forecast by Dr. Howard in May which stated
specifically that there would be no defiance of the Supreme
Court decision.22

Although Virginia's leaders repeatedly

affirmed the Commonwealth's intention to abidecby the law of
the land, they nevertheless embarked on a policy of delay and
resistance--a plan which was to be carried out through legal
channels.
It seems that the turning point--if, indeed, there is
such a point--in Virginia's reaction to the Bxovm decision
mu.st lie with the appointment of the Commission of Public
Education, commonly ref erred to as the Gray Commission.

Until

the appointment of this agency the voices of reaction were
tempered by those of moderation.

By appointing the Commission,

the Governor had created an official forum for debate of the
question; and the more extreme opinions began to gain wider
acceptance.
The Gray Commission was appointed on August 30, 1954, to
formulate a plan under which Virginia could meet the demands
of the Supreme Court's decision.23
see this

st~p.

as a rational, sincere

An

outside observer might

~ffort

to devise a policy

for complying with the directive of the Court; but closer
examination might have indicated otherwise.

The chairman,

State Senator Garland Gray of Waverly, represented a district
of the Tidewater region of Virginia.24

A majority of the Commission
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was taken from the other black-belt courj.ties of Southside and
Tidewater Virginia.25

No Negro was included on the Commission.

As the Gray Commission moved into action, it became clear that
the intention was to compose a policy not of compliance but
rather one of resistance to the Supreme Court's decision.
With the perspective of twelve years one might easily
draw such conclusions, but in 1954 perhaps logic aalled for
taking such an important commission from the rural areas.

One

should remember that the Supreme Court had not yet announced
its decision in Baker Y.!. Carr,26 the decision which ended rural
domination of legislatures by requiring greater representation
for urgan areas in both houses.

Consequently the political

leadership of the Commonwealth resided not in Richmond nor
Norfolk but more often that not in obscure places like Winchester, Waverly, and Blackstone.

Never since the days of

Reconstruction had Virginia faced such a monumental problem
or, as many Virginians saw it, threat.

What was more reason-

able, then, than to turn to those currently in positions of co~~a~Ji°_j
leadership for guidance?
The men to whom the people entrusted Virginia's reception
of the Brown case

were all members of the General Assembly.

Although the recommendations of the Commission were to lay the
groundwork for the

widely-acc~pted

policy of massive resistance,

the Commission was not greeted with universal acclaim.

The

NAACP feared that the Commission was designed to consider the
abolishment of the public school system;2$ the Lynchburg News
editorially questioned the wisdom of excluding Negroes from

membership;~

and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot criticized the

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J
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fact that no one other than male, white legislators was
appointed.29
But in its early weeks of planning, the Gray Commission
was to be the object of even stronger attaeks from unexpected
sources.

On October 5, 1954, Senator Gray addressea a meeting

of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties,
a pro-segregation organization centered for the most part in
the Southside counties.

J. Barrye Wall, editor of the Farmville

Herald, and Robert B. Crawford, a Farmville civic leader, organized
the Defenders.

Farmville, the major town in the Southside

county of Prince Edward, was to play a major role in succeeding
events.

In 1954 Prince Edward County's population was 44.6

Negro, one of the larger Negro communities in Virginia.30 In
later years Farmville became well-known for abolishing its
public school system in the fa£e of integration, and Editor
Wall was to play a major role in closing the schools there.
In other southern states White Citizens' Councils, groups
similar to the Defenders, were formed to combat integration.31
$uch groups as these always opposed integration and often believed
in a "conservative" approach to many other unrelated issues.
In the course of his address to the Defenders, the Senator
stated that he had no intention of seeing his grandchildren
attend integrated schools and added further
When I was appointed chairman of the Governor's
legislative committee on segregation, I told that
group I would act impartially and hear everything
anyone wanted to say on this vital question. But
I also said I have IIJT/Own personal convictions on
the issue which I do not intend to sacrifice on the
alter of political expediency.32

-9-

Although this statement was well-received by the Defenders,
the Methodist Church in Virginia became alarmed and leveled
severe criticism on the ~enator.

The Methodists d.emanded that

Virginians be entitled to an impartial, objective examination
of the issua at hand and questioned the wisdom of Gray's selection:
If this is a sample of the speeches the senator
LGraiJ ~ntends to make prior to the hearing in
November, it raises serious questions of his
competence to serve on the COIIllilission in any
capacity, whether as chairman or member.33
On November 15, 1954, the Gray Commission held a public
hearing at the Mosque, a public auditorium in Richmond,

Over

one hundred (100) persons testified before the Commission,
and their testimony indicated a wide spectrum of thought.

On

the one hand some witnesses advocated closing the schools rather
than integrating them while others called for sincere adherence
to the Supreme Court's decree.

The only open hearing on the

subject was at the Mosque, for the Commission's other meetings
were held in executive session.
The Gray Commission worked a total of fourteen (14)
months; and on November 11, 1955, Senator Gray presented its
report to Governor Stanley.

What the Commission presented was

not a plan for acceptance of the Brown decision; it was not
even a recommendation of means of compliance.

It was instead

a logical, legal plan for delaying implementation of the Court's
decrees.
Voluntary, rapid compliance with the Brown decision would
have been nothing short of a miracle for Virginia,:

Some of

her most highly-respected citizens opposed integration in_ any
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fashionr others urged slow, cautious compliance; and almost
all of them felt that the issue was being forced on the South
by "outsiders."

Clifford Dowdy, a distinguished writer from

Virginia, evaluated the southern reaction the year before.
In his presentation Dowdy accused the Supreme Court of entering
the legislative field and compared the Brown decision to the
defeat of the southern states at Appomattox.34

He predicted

that the South would attempt to avoid desegregation and argued
that integration in the South presented unique problems not
faced in other sections of the nation.35

A passage in his

article fairly accurately sums up the attitude of the Gray
Commission:

"••owhite southerners accepted this legislation

by the judiciary as something else dumped in their laps, as
was the freed Negro, for them to deal with in their own way. 11 36
So now the legislative committee presented its recommendations:

amend Section 141 to allow tuition grants for use in

private schools, establish a state fund for financing tuition
grants, and delegate to localities the authority to assign
pupils and teachers to different schools.37

The basic feature

of the G.ray Plan, tuition grants, hinged on the amending of
Section 141 which restricted the use of state funds to public
schools and pupils in such schools only.
In September, 1955, Attorney-General Almond filed a suit
(Almond :!!.. Day) in the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to
test the validity of tuition grants for use in private schools.
Citing the provisions of Section 141 which provided that "No
appropriation of public funds shall bejrnade to any school or
institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled
by the State or some political division thereof; ••• 11 38 Chief
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Justice John W. Eggleston of the Court delivered the decision
which· prohibited the use of tuition grants in private schools.39
The Gray Commission, then, in order to secure the amendment
to Section 141 asked the Governor .to summon a special session
of the General Assembly and to present enabline legislation
for the submission of the constitutional question to the
people in a referendum.40
In the proposed referendum the people would be asked to
authorize the calling of a constitutional convention which
would be empowered to amend Section 141 in order to legalize
the use of tuition grants in private institutions.

Perhaps

a good indication of the eagerness with which state officials
welcomed the report is the rapidity with which Governor Stanley
responded to the request for a special session.

He received

the report on November 11, 1955; and he convened the special
session on November 30e
As the date for the special session approached, some
legislators grew concerneafover the future of the public school
system in general.

They feared that a move was afoot to

remove the Commonwealth's obligation to provide free, public
education by amending Section 129 of the State Constitution.
This section, the first of thiirteen (13) constitutional provisions for public education, provided that "The General
Assembly shall establish and maintain an efficient system of
public free schools throughout the State. 11 41

State Senator

Ted Dalton, Republican senator for the white-belt area of
Roanoke, announced his desire to preserve the provisions of
this section; but the Senate refused

to/~ifically its desire

,-------------------------

-
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to retain Section 129.

Across the lobby on the House side

of the capitol, Delegate Omer L. Hirst from Fairfax County
and Falls Church, urged that tuition grants be used only in
areas maintaining a system of public schools.42

His proposal

was defeated by a voice vote in the House.
In short, no modification of the bill presented by the
Gray Commission was adopted.

By a vote of 38 to 1, Dalton's

vote being the only opposition, the Senate adopted the referendum bill.

The House of Delegates approved the bill by the

overwhelming majority of 93 to 5.43
A glance at the six (6) legislators in opposition indicates
something of the geographical influences on the issue.

Senator

Dalton was from Roanoke, an industrial center in the western
part of the state.

His district had a low percentage of

Negroes (15.9 per cent of the population)44 and often elected
Republicans to office.

In the House, four of the five opposing

votes were cast by legislators from northern Virginia's tenth
district.

One of them, Delegate Kathryn H. Stone, accused

state officials of plotting the proposed action months before.
She levelled the charge that Almond

Y.!_

Day had been "plainly

a handle to clear the way for private tuition grants. 11 45
Delegate Stuart B. Carter from Botetourt (10.1 per cent Negro
population)46 and Craig Counties (.5 per cent Negro population)47 cast the remaining

11

no" vote.48

Popular concern over the fate of education in the Commonweal th was also evident.

Many persons felt that Attorney-

General Almond's statement to the U.S. Supreme Court in
April, 1955, was on the verge of being adopted by the legis-

,---------------------------------------------
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lature.

Almond had said, "We are facing ••• possible destruction

of the free public-school system. 11 49

The legislature's

ref'usal to specifically protect Section 129 from consideration
by the proposed convention did nothing to dispel this fear.
In December, 1955, ten (10) of Virginia's eleven chapters of
the Women's League of Voters adopted resolutions opposing
the Gray Plan.

They felt that the tuition grant proposal

was unconstitutiona1.50
Religious groups began to speak on the issue in various
ways.

The-Richmond Methodist Ministers' Conference adopted

a resolution by a vote of 26 to 10 which stated that "segregation as now practiced is neither constitutional, democratic,
nor Christian. 11 51

The Norfolk Ministers Association, the

Harrisonburg Ministerial Association, the Virginia Council
of United Church Women, and several other religious bodies
added their disapproval to the growing discussion of the
Gray proposals.52
Virginia's public school teachers also expressed their
concern over the issue.

The Virginia Education Association

announced its fear that damage to public education would
result from forced integration.53

The teachers never advocated

closing public schools and as a whole opposed any moves in
that direction, although they never officially commented on
the modification of Section 14<l.54

Their unwillingness to

close the schools is understandable, since closed schools
meant fewer positions for educators.
Even though the peopie were given the opportunity to

-14-

express themselves on amending the constitution (and in
doing so to pass indirect judgement on the Gray Plan), the
state officials did not remain neutral on the issue.

The

State Heferendum Information Center was established as an
official agency, and Governor Stanley appointed Dr. Dabney
S. Lancaster to coordinate the Center's work.55
Many prominent Virginians supported calling the convention, and the Information Center used their voices to a
great extent.

Former Governor John

s.

Battle agreed with

U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, the acknowledged patriarch of
Virginia politics, in urging the adoption of the proposal.
U.S. Senator A. Willis Robertson on December 19 announced
that the s.tate had no choice " ••• save to take the middleof-the-road course urged by the Gray Commiasion--a course
in which the convention is the first step. 11 56
Dr. Howard and Former Governor Colgate Darden, then
president of the University of Virginia, supported the proposed amendment provided that Section 129 remain in force.
Parke C. Brinkley, state commissioner of agriculture, urged
city-dwellers to vote for the convention and in doing so to
aid the rural areas of the Commonwealth.57

Many agricultural

organizations such as the Virginia Farmers' Union called for
the change in Section 14.1.
The Information Center, however, was not the only organization in the campaign.

A group of well-known citizens organized

the Virginia Society for Preservation of Public Education
(VSPPE) in December, 1955, with Delegate Armistead Boothe

L___
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as chairman and Delegate Kathryn H. Stone as co-ordinator.
The VSPPE called tuition gants illegal, unconstitutional, and
unworkable and charged that the tuition grant plan would allow
the wealthy to attend private, segregated schools while forcing
the poor to attend integrated public schools.58
On

~anuary

5, 1956, only three days before the referen-

dum, Governor Stanley addressed the electors on statewide
radio.

In the speech he equated a vote against the proposed

amendment as a vote for integrated schools.59

State Senator

Dalton replied with an ominous warning that adoption of the
proposal would take Virginia into "a futile plan that may
not stand the test of legality. 11 60

The next day the Henrico

County Classroom Teachers' Association by a vote of 26 to 2
supported the proposal for amending the constitution.61

The

ease with which public school teachers could be discharged
during the period helps to explain the minute minority on the
vote.
All efforts to keep Section 141 intact

fail~d.

By a

margin of 157,990 the voters called for a convention, and in
doing so they assured the amending of Section 1410

The work

of the Information Center had been successful, and the first
major step toward massive resistance had been taken.
Delegates to the convention were chosen on February 21,
1956, in a general election; and the majority of the delegates had favored the amendment in their campaigns.

On March 7

the convention amended Section 142 as expected and thus
made tuition grants legal in Virginia.
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In the course of its debate, however, the convention
was not of one mind.

H.D. Dawbarn from the twenty-second

district62 charged that the Gray Report favored the Southside and Tidewater situations while ignoring the problems
confronting other sections of the Commonwealth.

He promised

to support a plan of local option in the use of tuition grants,q~
but Attorney-General Almond arbitrarily ruled the consideration of Dawbarn's plan by the convention out of order under
the legislative act which called the convention into session.
Perhaps the most sensational development in the convention was the introduction of a resolution by Blackstone's
J. 3egar Gravatt.

This resolution commended the General

Assembly for having entered a "contest of power" with the
U.S. Supreme Court over the Brown decision.64

B9
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Through-

out the convention's meetings there was never any doubt that
Section 14;1 would be amended.

The convention remained united,

as a whole, against any proposal other than that submitted
by the Gray Commission.
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Chapter 2.
Interposition--A Ghost of the Past

-

------

The policy which Virginia had finally chosen reached its
peak on February 1, 1956, when the General Assembly adopted
the famous Resolution of Interposition.

This act of the

legislature culminated three months of a determined effort
by several Virginians to invoke a modern application of the
historic doctrine which John C. Calhoun had termed "the fundamental principle of our system [Of governmeng 11 65
During the administration of John Adams, Congress passed
the Alien and Sedition Acts, a series of measures which restricted
freedom of speech and tended to stifle opposition to the
Federalist administration.
but Virginia and

~entuck:y

Several states opposed the acts,
were especially displeased.

In

1798 Virginia ninterposed" her sovereignty and declared the
acts unconstitutional through the adoption of a resolution
written by James Madison.

In 1798 and 1799 Kentucky adopted

her interposition resolutions which were composed by Jefferson,
and declared the Alien and Sedition Acts void in that state.
Although Virginia and Kentucky both adopted the Resolutions, other states failed to follow their lead; and consequently
there was never a direct confrontation between state and
federal authority.

In 1800 the Alien and Sedition Acts

expired and were not re-enact·ed.

Thus the only purpose served

by asserting a state's right to interpose her sovereignty
against federal authority was to give Virginia and Kentucky

-18-

an opportunity to state their positions dramatically.

The

question was never considered in cou:rt, and with the expiration
of the Alien and Sedition.,Acts in 1800 the issue became a
moot point.
These resolutions, however, announced a new concept in
political theory.

First, they stated that the Union was a

voluntary compact of the states to which certain powers were
delegated.

.Furthermore, and most importantly, they held that

the ultimate power to interpret the constitution rested not
in the federal government but with the states themselves.
No major interposition issue arose again until 1832
with the nullification controversy.

John

c.

Calhoun, the

South's leading political theorist and Vice-President of the
United States, developed an elaborate theory of the Union.
The South Carolina Exposition, secretly written by Calhoun
in 1828 to protest that the "Tariff of Abominations" was
unconstitutional, argued that a state had the rieht to judee
the constitutionality of an act of Congress.66

Calhoun was

able to refer to Jefferson and Madison, supporters of the
earlier Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, for support of
his theory.

The South Carolina General Assembly officially

endorsed the Exposition in 1828 and used its arguments as
the basis for actions of future years.
In 1832 South Carolina declared that the tariff acts of
1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional, and as a result "null,
void, and no law, nor binding upon this State. ri67

The nulli-

fication convention, however, went a step further than had
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Virginia and Kentucky in 1798 by calling on the legislature
to prevent enforcement of the law in that state.

Finally,

the convention threatened to take the Palmetto State out of
the Union if the tariff laws were enforced.68
President Andrew Jackson, believiilg:;that nullification
was unjustified and illegal, asked Congress to proclaim the
federal constitution and law supreme.69

Congress responded

with the Foree,; Bill which authorized the use of rnili tary
and naval units to enforce the tariff laws.

After Jackson

had taken steps to enforce the law, even in advance of the
congressional authorization, efforts were made to reach a
compromise on the issue.

South Carolina repealed its nulli-

fication of the tariff iaws in 1833 with the adoption of a
compromise tariff bill.
Although the Nullification Controversy was the most
dramatic example of interposition attempts in the United
States (with the exception of the Civil War), it did not
succeed in limiting federal authority.

No other peaceful

interposition attempt was to reach the magnitude of this,
controversy; and, indeed, few other attempts were:

made~.

These ideas were to arise again in American history, and most
of the issues sparking such discussions were to revolve around
the "place" of the Negro in American life.

In 1859 Wisconsin invoked an interposition measure to
impede enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law by the courts.70

'l't
•
• • 1 war was th rea t ening
•
•
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S1nce
c1v1
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eo~~~~~a~ien

between Wisconsin and the federal government

arose. Interposition reached its logical conclusion with the
secession of the southern states in 1860-1861. The resulting
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Civil War settled the conflict between the state and federal
governments for all practical purposes by laying to rest the
"twin nightmares" of nullification and secession.71

By

1865, then, the issue of interposition appeared to be dead,
but Virginia was the first to revive it in 1956.
Virginians learned of the interposition idea largely
through the efforts of James J. Kilpatrick, Jr., the editor
of Richmond's Nevw<s-Leader.

So effective was his campaign to

have Virginia "interpose" her sovereignty in the Brown decision
that he has .been called the "'father' of modern interposition. 11 72
The News-Leader had earlier endorsed the Gray Commission's recommendations, but Kilpatrick felt the need to go
a step further.

This step was interposition.73

A pamphelt

written in 1955 by William Old, an attorney in Richmond's
neighboring Chesterfield County and later a judge in that
county, apparently furnished the stimulus for Kilpatrick's
subsequent campaign. 74

Kilpatrick' s fi.rst statement on the

question came on November 21, 1955, in his lead editorialo
Throughout the following weeks the News-Leader carried editorials and documents including writings of Calhoun in support
of the interposition proposition.

On November 29, the eve

of the special session convened by the Governor to consider
the Gray Re:port, the editor wrote "We believe the question
can be answered in one way only.

It is by pressing for adop-

tion of the Gray Commission's own program in Virginia; and
beyond this, by saying to the Nation that Virginia's answer
is.: Interposition, nowL"75
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The special session did n®t consider this proposal, but
Kilpatrick did not give up.

He aimed his campaign for the

regular session of January, 1956, only a month away.

The

only vocal journalistic protest to the Kilpatrick proposal
came from the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot; but because of its
limited circulation, it was no match for the News-Leader.
Editorial pressure for the adoption of interposition
as a state policy was effective among many citizens; but
Governor Stanley remained non-committal.

More direct pres-

sure, however, was being applied by other groups, and the
Defenders were in the lead.
Cr~wford,

On January 13, 1956, Robert

president of the Defenders, led a delegation in

aupport of interposition to call on the Governor.

Stanley

gave no concrete opinion on the issue at that time.76

On

January 24 the Governor with three other southern governors
finally committed himself to the doctrine of interposition
as. a means for resisting the Brown ruling.

All four men--

South Carolina's Timmerman, Georgia's Griffin, Mississippi's
Coleman, and Stanley of Virginia--were to sign interposition
measures within a matter of weeks.
The interposition resolution, knovm officially as Senate
Joint Resolution 3 (1956), was adopted on February 1.

Thirty-

five (35) of forty (40) Virginia state senators supported

~he

interposition bill, and only seven of one hundred (100)
delegates refused to support
of Delegates.

measure in the House

Every opponent of th;fneasure represented a

"white-belt" constituency.77

L __ --------

a similar
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Once the foundation for massive resistance had been
laid, another special session of the General Assembily in
September of 1956 would pass twenty-three (23) specific bills
to declare Virginia's. position officially and openly.78
But these measures were still in the planning stages during
the interposition struggle.
Interposition, the result of Kilpatrick's irresponsible
and useless campaign, easily fitted into the plans of Senator
Byrd.

By his smooth handling of a well-oiled political

machine, the. ·Senator led Virginia down a blind alley in her
most serious problem since the Reconstruction.

Just as. the

logical end of interposition is secess,ion, so is interposition
the result of mass,ive resistance when carried to its logical
conclusion.

The irony is that in 1956 the cart came before

the horse in Virginia, for massive resistance was not born
until late in that year.
The interposition resolutions, as expected, caused national
concern, not only on the state level but in national political
circles as well.

When President Eisenhower was asked to com-

ment on these expressions of state supremacy, he replied
that he could "never abandon or refuse to carry out f_hii/
own duty" in the enforcement of federal law.79

The President

stated clearly that the Court's decisions carried the force
of law.

It was evident, then, that the executive branch of

the federal government felt duty-bound to support the judiciary.
Although interposition in 1956 did not employ the direct
use of state force against federal authority, it did bring
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the states'-rights issue to a boil.

Belatedly in 1960 the

U.S. SuPreme Court made its first comment on the nebulous
doctrine in a case brought before it from Louisiana.

In a

brief opinion the Court upheld a three-judge court's ruling
that "'interposition is not a constitutional doctrine'" and
concluded that the question was u!without substance.•u80
If there had been any real question concerning interposition's
value in 1956, the Supreme Court in 1960 answered it with
finality.
Virginia's resolution of interposition became nothing
more than an expression of defiance.

It had no force of

law; it received no judicial notice.

In short, the resolution,

although full of Shakespeare's sound and fury, signified nothing
in practicality.
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Conclusion
After a few promising weeks of moderation in the summer
of 1954, Virginia turned her back on a spirit of reluctant
acceptance of what appeared inevitable and turned to a spirit
of total defiance.

Her progress toward massive resistance

made its greatest advances during 1955 and early 1956.

Dr.

Howard had even advoBAted moderation in a brief paraeraph
of his annual report of 1954:

"The issue Lfntegratio.!'17 must

receive the calm, deliberate, forthright, and prayerful considerations of all Virginians.
will be met and solved.81

With this

~.piri t

the problems

The Virginia Education Association

also called for calm leadership of both races.~L
A year later, however, the Gray Plan was unveiled, and

the first legislation dealing with the integration issue was
adopted.

At that point, however, massive resistance was still

a maneuver for the future.

The remainder of 1954 and 1955

witnessed the formation of groups such as the Defenders and
ideas such as massive resistance, but little action'j was
taken.
Then with the appointment of the Gray Commission, and
more especially with the filing of its report to the Governor,
Virginia's attitude seems to have changed.

The Gray Plan

did not compile a workable formula for compliance with the
Hrown ruling.

Indeed, it stated that "This Commission believes

that separate facilities in our public schools are in the
best interests of both races ••• and that compUlsory inteeration

t/"
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should be resisted by all proper means in our power. 11 83

Here

is the first serious proposal for massive resistance, but the
legislature did not adopt the measures necessary to implement
it as a policy until September of 1956.

That there was a

delay in Virginia's actions on this issue is undeniable.
One obvious reason for the delay is found in the Brown
decision itself.

The Supreme Court, italnuld be remembered,

had postponed publication of any decree of implementation
until the states affected had presented their suggestions
for methods of procedure.

Virginia used this delay to pre-

pare her case and to await the secondary ruling.
Another not-so-obvious cause for delay may have been the
mood of the people.
moderationo

Many prominent citizens had called for

Senator Dalton, for example, never changed his

call for a middle-of-the-road approach; and one state legislator, Senator Stuart B. Carter, even announced that he
favored gradual but orderly integration.84

Clearly the more

reactionary persons needed the time after the Brown ruling
to "educate" the citizenry to the position of resistance.
~ben

the resistance measures came, moderate voices were seldom

heard. These measures aided segregationists and forced moderates
more.,
to beAsilent.85
The personal role of Senator Harry F. Byrd in the integration controversy is obscure.

One characteristic of his

influence in Virginia politics.was the obscurity in which his
will was carried out.

On December 17, 1955, he endorsed the

Gray Commission's recommendation for amending the state cons-

-26-

titution, and soon thereafter other political leaders in the
state followed suit.
Senator Byrd's opposition to the Brown decision was
bitter, and in his bitterness he lent a great influence to
the movement of non-compliance not
throughout the South as wel1.86

on~y

in Virginia but

Byrd's support of massive

resistance was flatly declared on February 2, 1956, the day
after Virginia "interposed" her authority in opposition to
the S.upreme Court's decision.

He quietly affirmed his position

by saying "'it is our duty to resist illegal encroachment. 11 87
What the leaders of the Commonwealth hoped to gain by
delaying the implementation of the Brown decree is not clear.
The Supreme Court had ordered federal district courts to
carry out then.decision, and President Eisenhower had announced
his intention to enforce the law.88

No reasonable person

could have believed that the decision could be totally ignored
or flaunted.

Perhaps Virginia's leaders felt a political

necessity to protest the Brown rulingo

If this were the case,

their objections were not so reactionary nor yet so mild as
they might have been.

They may have desired the time to

establish more private schools, but few were established until
after 1956.
Massive resistance, interpostion, and all the rest of
the segregationist measures adopted in Virginia were mere
exercises in futility.

Governor Stanley's authoritative

statement "I shall use every legal means at my command to
continue segregated schools •••• "8 9 served only to arouse
Virginia to a hopeless and useless resistance.
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In all their statements proclaiming the intention to
resist integration, however, Virginia's leaders were careful
to remain within the law.

Governor Stanley had stressed

"legal means" to continue segregation,90 Byrd had urged
resistance to "illegal encroachments, 11 91 and the Gray Commission hE¥i recommended resistance "by all proper means. 11 92
Attorney-General Almond even recognized the authority of
the federal dictum on segregation by asserting that the
Brown decision was still binding on Virginia even in the wake
of interposition.93
Some authorities have implied to some degree that had
Virginia's leaders stayed on the road of moderation, integration would have been easier for the South to accept.

Out-

side observers crrticized Virginia by saying that the "ruling
political organization" in the Cormnonwealth could have avoided
mass.ive resistanceo94
Vi~ginia

This idea must be rejected.

Certainly

could have made it easier on the South had she been

able to accept a moderate course, but this route was not open
to her leaders.

Throughout the massive resistance movement

Virginia's leaders remained rather moderate in their application of th~olicy.

'While castigating certain parts of the

law, they were careful to remain within its bounds.

T.here

were no governors at the school-house door in Virginia to defy
the federal authorities.

Editor Kilpatrick had

defended the

wisdom of quiet opposition by writing that for Virginia to
"defy the Court openly fjy italics?would be to enter upon
anarchy !'9 5
Parts of Virginia, the Tidewater and Southside especially,
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were emotionally aroused by the Brown decision.

These areas

had always thought of the Negro as the domestic servant or
farm hand, and many persons would not agree to a change in
his situation.

The wel?l-educated, more responsible members

of the Negro community were rarely found in these areas of
Virginia.

Southside counties and Tidewater leadership guided

the Commonwealth along the course of massive resistance; and
no one was able to alter that course effectively.
Virginia certainly viewed the entire integration issue
as yet another battle to fight with the North.

A state in

which the Civil War still lives in many ways, Virginia reacted
as if another Reconstruction period were being imposed upon
her. 96

The G.ray Report had referred to this awareness of

the past by declaring that "The public schools have been
built up slowly and pa:Lilfully from the ashes of 1865. 11 97

One

hundred years later the Old Dominion provided leadership
for the South in yet another crisis involving the Negro, but
in~1954

this leadership was not thrust upon her by the actions

of a sister state.
assumed.

It was, rather, carefully and deliberately

Virginia, historically,a far-sighted national leader,

in 1954 deserted reason for emotion.
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